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In the past decade, there have been changes in the workplace as 
momentous as those that occurred at the turn of the last century when 
artisan production gave way to industrial era production systems. Guided 
by the postulates of scientific management and personnel management, 
early 20
th century industrialists repudiated the labor relations systems of 
the past and constructed a new labor relations system in its place. They 
erected a system of industrial practices comprised of job ladders, internal 
promotion schemes, seniority, welfare benefits, and inducements for 
long-term employment -- a system known as an internal labor market -- 
that has dominated major U.S. firms throughout the 20
th century. At the 
end of the 20
th century, the internal labor market job structures 
themselves began to dissipate. Employers, faced with increased 
competition in the product market and technological change in production 
methods, began to seek more efficient and effective ways to organize the 
workplace. They sought flexibility rather than stability in their work force. 
Out of their efforts have emerged a new constellation of features that are 
increasingly defining the new digital era workplace– an explicit rejection 
of job security combined with promises of training and opportunities for 
human capital development, a flattening of hierarchy, opportunities for 
lateral movement within and between firms, market-based pay with steep 
performance incentives, opportunities to network with firm 
constituencies, an emphasis on quality and customer satisfaction at all 
levels, and plant-specific dispute resolution mechanisms to foster and 
preserve a perception of fairness. Taken together, these features mean 
that attachment between the employee and the employer has been 
severed, and employees now operate in a boundaryless workplace.
1  
The new employment system promises both freedom and vulnerability 
to the working population. For some, it signifies an escape from the rigid 
hierarchies of the past, hierarchies that were often racially or gender 
biased in their operation. It also promises to free many from the mind-
numbing narrowness of work tasks that were required by the precisely 
defined job classifications of the past. Yet the new system also creates 
great vulnerability. It shifts many of the risks of the employment 
relationship from the firm to the individual.  Gone is the individual job 
security and reliable income and benefits of the past. Individuals must 
manage their careers, market their talents, and take their compensation 
as the market measures their value. The new workplace also generates 
serious concerns about workplace fairness and social justice. Elsewhere I 
have documented the ways in which the changing work practices 
                                                 
1 Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing 
Workplace for Labor and Employment Regulation, 48 UCLA Law Rev. 519 (2001).                                              KATHERINE V.W. STONE 
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generate new forms of discrimination that are difficult to eradicate, new 
dangers for employees to forfeit their own human capital and intellectual 
property, new difficulties for union organizing, and new impediments to 
collective representation and voice.
2 In this paper I discuss the impact of 
the changing workplace on income distribution. 
The changes in the employment relationship have been accompanied 
by a marked deterioration in income distribution. The U.S. income 
distribution has become considerably more unequal since 1970, a trend 
that accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s. The growing gap between rich 
and poor stands as a persistent reminder that current economic 
arrangements are not moving in the direction of economic justice. The 
dramatic extent of inequality offends our sense of decency and 
undermines social cohesion. In recent years, many economists have 
analyzed the trends in income distribution in order to isolate the causes 
of the current trends. In this paper I review the existing evidence and 
theories about the causes of rising income inequality. I suggest that the 
changing nature of the employment relationship is contributing to, or 
perhaps even driving, rising income inequality. The following chapter 
presents and evaluates several policy proposals for redressing inequality 
or ameliorating its effects.  
 
A. The Causes of Rising Income Inequality 
 
A.I  What Really Happened?  
While there are many ways to measure income inequality, all measures 
tell the same story: There has been an increase in income inequality in 
the United States since 1970 and a particularly sharp increase in the late-
1980s and mid-1990s. For example, the share of total income going to 
those in the highest ten percent of the income distribution -- called the 
top decile -- increased from under 32 per cent in 1970 to nearly 42 per 
cent in 1998. Of this, the lion’s share of the increase went to those in the 
very top. The share of total income going to the highest one per cent of 
the population has more than doubled between 1970 and 1998, from 5 
per cent to 11 per 1998.  And the share going to the top 0.1 per cent 
more than tripled in that period, rising from under 2 per cent to 6 per 
cent.
3 
Since the late 1970s, only those with incomes in the highest 7 or 8 
                                                 
2 Id. 
3 Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, 1913 - 1998, 
NBER Working Paper 8467, Figure 1 (September, 2001). INCOME INEQUALITY IN THE DIGITAL ERA 
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percent have seen increases in their hourly pay.
4 The income of wage-
earners in all other groups experienced declines. The share of income 
going to the bottom 20 per cent -- the bottom quintile-- has declined 
most severely. The attached Table shows that between 1979 and 1999, 
the incomes of those in the bottom quintile declined in absolute terms by 
9 percent, shrinking from 5.7 per cent of total income to 4.2 per cent. In 
the same period, the share of total income going to the middle quintile 
declined from 16.4 per cent to 14.7 per cent, while those in the highest 
quintile grew from 44.2 percent to 50.4 percent. According to the Center 
for Budget Priorities, “In 1999, for the first time in the years CBO has 
examined, the top fifth of the population is expected to receive slightly 
more after-tax income than the rest of the population combined.”
5 
 
[insert Table] 
 
One measure of inequality economists use is to compare the income of 
those in the top ten percent of the income distribution with those in the 
lowest ten percent, a number known as the 90/10 ratio. Between 1970 
and 1998, the 90/10 ration for men increased from 3.85 to 5.31, and for 
women increased from 3.41 to 4.33. This indicates substantial increase in 
inequality between those at the top and those at the bottom of the 
income distribution.
6  Or to put it the contrast even more starkly, as of 
1999, the share of income of the top one percent, some 2.7 million 
Americans, is approximately the same as that of the 100 million 
Americans with the lowest incomes.
7 This dramatic rise at the very top of 
the income distribution has generated a small group earning mega-
salaries, a group known as the “Working Rich.”
8   
In addition to comparing the top to the bottom, economists also 
measure inequality by looking at whether there has been a dispersion or 
a convergence between the bottom and the middle of the income 
distribution. To measure growing inequality in the lower part of the 
income distribution, economists compare the share of total income going 
to the group in middle, those in the fifty per cent decile, with the share 
going to the bottom, the ten per cent  decile. This comparison, the 50/10 
                                                 
4 Gary Burtless, Robert Z. Lawrence, Robert E. Litan and Robert J. Shapiro, GLOBALPHOBIA: 
CONFRONTING FEARS ABOUT OPEN TRADE 77-78 (Brookings Institute, 1998). 
5 Isaac Shapiro and Rocbert Greenstein, The Widening Income Gulf, Center on Budget 
Priorities (September 9, 1999).  See also, Frank Levy, THE NEW DOLLARS AND DREAMS at 199, 
Table A.1. 
6 U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Reports, “The Changing Shape of the Nation’s 
Income Distribution,” Table 1, page 3 (June, 2000). 
7 Shapiro and Greenstein, supra. at 2.  See also, Piketty [check]. 
8 Piketty and Saez, at___ & Figure 4.                                              KATHERINE V.W. STONE 
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ratio has increased in the past thirty years. The 50/10 ratio for men 
increased from 2.14 to 2.43 between 1970 and 1998, and for women it 
increased 1.98 to 2.08 in the same period. These numbers reveal that 
while the income spread between the top and the bottom has also been 
increasing dramatically, inequality between the middle and the bottom 
has also been increasing, but not by as much.
9  
Another measure of income inequality is a number known as the gini 
coefficient. The gini coefficient measures how far a particular distribution 
of income departs from a distribution of total equality. If income were 
distributed equally amongst everyone, the gini coefficient would be zero. 
If income were distributed totally unequally -- i.e., if one person had all 
the income and everyone else had none -- the gini coefficient would be 1. 
A gini coefficient of greater than zero indicates the presence of inequality, 
and the closer the coefficient is to 1, the greater the amount of inequality 
present. In the U.S., the gini ratio for men has increased from 0.305 to 
0.401 between 1970 and 1998; for men and women combined it has 
increased from 0.326 to 0.393. These are the largest gini ratios of any 
industrial country.
10 By all these measures, aggregate income inequality 
in the U.S. has increased dramatically in the past two decades.  
Yet another measure of income inequality compares the executive pay 
levels to those of the average wages or salaried full-time worker. This 
inquiry reveals that the ratio of top CEO pay to average pay of a full-time 
worker has widened substantially, particularly since 1980. As recently as 
1980, an average CEO of a large American company earned 42 times the 
earnings of the average worker; twenty years later, in 2000, the same 
CEOs earned 419 times an average worker’s pay.
11 Between 1970 and 
1999, the pay of the top-paid 100 CEOs increased by more than 400 per 
cent while that of the average salaried worker remained flat.
12  
When the income distribution figures are broken down in more detail, 
two features stand out. First, there has been a dramatic increase in the 
incomes of the highest earners. Indeed, the higher the income group, the 
greater the increases. For example, the per cent increases for the top 5 
per cent of the income distribution was considerably greater than the 
increases for those between the 90th and the 95th percentile. Second, 
                                                 
9 Piketty, supra. at ___. 
10 Id. 
11 Robert H. Frank, Higher Education: The Ultimate Winner-Take-All Market?, paper on file 
with author. [check Business Week, April 17, 2000]  [There is a similar statistic in Robert 
Frank, Luxury Fever (1999), reporting that in 1973, CEOs of large companies earned 35 
times that of the average worker, and in 1999 they earned about 200 times as much.  p. 
33) 
12 Piketty and Saez, supra. at Figure 18. INCOME INEQUALITY IN THE DIGITAL ERA 
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the returns to education have increased dramatically. Wages of lower 
skilled workers – those workers with only a high school diploma or less – 
have declined precipitously in the past three decades, while those with 
college degrees or higher educational attainment have increased 
disproportionately. For example, male high school drop-outs experienced 
a decline of 20.8 per cent in their real median income between 1967 and 
1999. Males with a high school diploma but no additional schooling 
experienced declines of 6.5 per cent. Yet in the same period, males with 
a college degree or more have seen a rise in their median incomes of 
13.4 per cent. Or, to put it differently, a college educated man earned 
149.7 percent of what a high school graduate earned in 1967, and 181.4 
per cent in 1999.  
The change in the education wage premium for women has also been 
pronounced. In 1967, women who completed college earned 151.1 per 
cent of women who had only completed high school; by 1999, college-
educated women earned 181 per cent of their high school educated 
peers.
13 Concomitantly, occupational wage differentials have moved in a 
direction that indicate a rising returns to education. Between 1970 and 
1987, incomes of professionals and managers rose considerably while 
those of clerical, craftsmen, operatives, and laborers fell.
14  
 
A.II  The Theories 
 
A.II.1.  Skill-Biased Technological Change 
Economists agree about the facts of growing inequality, but they disagree 
about its cause. Some of the factors cited to explain the phenomenon are 
the decline of unions, the decline in the minimum wage in real dollars, 
increased international trade, rising trade deficits, the shift from 
manufacturing to service sector production, and technological change. Of 
these, the most frequently cited explanation is that technological 
advances, particularly the advent of computerized technologies, have 
created greater demand for higher skilled and more educated workers 
and diminished demand for less skilled and less educated workers. By 
means of a simple application of the laws of supply and demand, this 
theory posits that skill-biased technological change has driven up the 
                                                 
13 Francine D. Blau, Marianne A. Ferber, and Anne E. Winkler, THE ECONOMICS OF WOMEN, MEN 
AND WORK 267-268 (4
th Ed.) (Prentice-Hall, 2002). 
14 Juhn, Murphy, & Pierce, Accounting for the Slowdown in Black-White Wage Convergence, 
in Marvin H. Kosters, WORKERS AND THEIR WAGES, 107, 135-139 & Table 4-7.                                              KATHERINE V.W. STONE 
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wages of the higher skilled and driven down those of the lower skilled.
15  
The skill-biased technological change explanation has become the 
overwhelmingly dominant explanation for rising income inequality. 
However, there is a growing chorus of economists who suggest it is not 
the sole explanation. For example, Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez 
challenge the skill-biased technological change thesis on the ground that 
the timing of the shifts in income disparities does not support it.  Using 
IRS data to examine changes in the U.S. income distribution since 1913, 
Piketty and Saez found that income distribution narrowed during World 
War I due to wage controls, remained compressed until 1970, and then 
began to widen steadily. Piketty and Saez contend that widening income 
disparity cannot be simply a response to technical change or changes in 
the supply of educated workers, because otherwise inequality would have 
increased immediately after the wartime wage controls were removed 
rather than remain compressed until 1970. Similarly, they contend that 
the huge increase in the incomes of the top since the 1970s is not 
compatible with the explanation based solely upon the advent of 
computerized technology because the increase is highly concentrated 
among the very highest earners. The theory cannot account for the rise 
of the Working Rich. Piketty and Saez instead posit that changing social 
norms is an important factor in explaining the recent increase in income 
inequality, particularly in the rise of mega-incomes for the very top 
earners. They argue that the redistributive policies of the New Deal 
period and pressures from labor unions constrained wage inequality in 
the U.S. from WWII until the mid-1970s. In recent years, those social 
norms and union pressures have subsided, allowing the incomes of 
the“Working Rich” to rise.
16 
Economist David Howell also challenges the skill-biased theory on 
grounds of its timing. Unlike Piketty and Saez, Howell focuses on the 
bottom of the income distribution rather than the top. He shows that the 
largest decline in the wages of those at the bottom of the income 
distribution occurred between 1979 and 1983, a time before there was 
significant computerization in the workplace. While wage dispersion 
increased after 1983, the shift away from low skilled labor had already 
occurred.
17 Like Piketty and Saez, Howell argues that institutional factors 
                                                 
15 See, e.g. Frank Levy, THE  NEW  DOLLARS AND DREAMS: AMERICAN  INCOMES AND ECONOMIC 
CHANGE, 86-87 (Russell Sage, New York, 1998); Burtless, et. al., GLOBAPHOBIA, supra. at 83-
84;. 
16 Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, 1913 - 
1998, 26-28, NBER Working Paper 8467, (September, 2001).   
17 David R. Howell, Theory-Drive Facts and the Growth in Earnings Inequality, 54 Rev. of 
Rad. Poli. Economics 54, 64-70 (1999). INCOME INEQUALITY IN THE DIGITAL ERA 
 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona"  12/2002 
9
9 
explain the collapse of wages for those in the lower 70 percent of the 
income distribution in the 1980s and 90s.  He argues that the ideological 
shift toward laissez faire markets and the globalization of production 
ushered in a host of public policies that undermined workers’ bargaining 
power.  Some of these policies were a decline in the real minimum wage, 
an increase in legal and illegal immigration, welfare reform, and public 
and private policies that undermined unions.
18  
Some economists have challenged the skill-based technological change 
theory on other grounds. For example, some point out that if skill-biased 
technological change were the sole  explanation, we would expect to 
observe similar trends in the income distribution in other countries that 
experienced similar technological advances during the same period. 
France and Canada are examples of countries that have production 
processes akin to the U.S. but have not experienced growing income 
inequality. In France, for example, the share of total income going to the 
highest decile declined between 1970 and 1998 from almost 33 per cent 
to 32 percent, with a dip to 30 percent in the mid 1980s. In Canada, in 
the 1980s, family inequality, as reflected in the gini coefficient, actually 
fell. Other countries that experienced the same technological changes 
have experienced vastly different effects on their national income 
distributions.
19  
Despite such counter-factual evidence, the international comparison 
does not entirely refute the skill-biased technological change thesis. After 
all, each country has its own set of wage setting institutions and 
traditions that mediate with differing degrees of success whatever effect 
technological change might have on the income distribution. Thus, it is 
possible that even with a shift toward higher technology production 
processes, the impact on a country’s income distribution could differ due 
to differences in institutions and policies that are available to combat the 
dis-equalizing effects.
20  
Francine Blau and Larry Kahn conducted an exhaustive comparative 
study of income distribution in Western Europe and concluded that 
technological change alone does not explain differing experiences with 
                                                 
18 David Howell, Skills and the Wage Collapse, American Prospect piece. 
19 On income inequality in France, see David R. Howell, Theory-Driven Facts and the Growth 
in Earnings Inequality, 31 RRPE 54, 62-63 (1999);  Piketty and Saez, supra. n. ___, ___ & 
Figure 19. On inequality in Canada, see David Card & Richard B. Freeman, Small Differences 
that Matter: Canada vs. The United States, in Richard B. Freeman, ed., WORKING  UNDER 
DIFFERENT RULES, 189, 193 (Russell Sage, 1994).  For other cross country comparisons, see 
Blau and Kahn; Pontesson. 
20 See Richard B. Freeman & Lawrence F. Katz, Rising Wage Inequality: The United States 
vs. Other Advanced Countries, in Freeman, WORKING UNDER DIFFERENT RULES, supra., 29, 51-
56.                                              KATHERINE V.W. STONE 
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inequality -- that it is also necessary to factor in the differential role of 
labor laws, unions, and other wage setting institutions.
21 Blau and Kahn’s 
findings are consistent with those of Piketty and Saez and Howell to the 
effect that public policies and private practices can exacerbate or mitigate 
the dis-equalizing impact of skill-biased technological change.  
Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison also dispute the skill-biased 
technological change thesis. They argue that if it were correct, we would 
expect to find the most wage growth in science and technical fields. But 
this is not the case. Rather, they show that between 1979 and 1995, “the 
real winners in the earnings derby were not those on the forefront of the 
new computerized technologies, but medical doctors (up 43 percent), 
lawyers (24 percent) sales representatives and brokers (24 percent), and 
managers (15 percent).”
22 Bluestone and Harrison conclude that 
inequality must be seen as a combination of factors such as 
deindustrialization, deunionization, global trade, immigration, and the 
trade deficit.
23  
 
A.II.2. The Shift From Manufacturing to Service Industries 
Another approach to explaining rising income inequality attributes the 
change to the shift in the United States from manufacturing to a service 
sector economy in the past twenty years.  The argument is that 
manufacturing jobs are generally higher paid than service sector jobs, so 
that as the United States has undergone “de-industrialization,” the 
incomes of those at the bottom have deteriorated. As Frank Levy and 
Richard Murname write, former craftsmen and basic industry factory 
workers have “become ‘hamburger flippers’ in the service sector -- rather 
than engineers and market specialists.”
24  
The reason why lower skilled service jobs have generally paid less than 
lower skilled manufacturing jobs is that service jobs, such as waitressing, 
lawn-cutting, or work in dry cleaning establishments, tend to be labor-
intensive and thus subject to intense wage competition. Further, 
                                                 
21 See Francine D. Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn, US LABOR  MARKET  PERFORMANCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE THE ROLE OF LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS (New York, Russell Sage 
Foundation, forthcoming); Bjorn Gustafsson and Mats Johansson, In Search of Smoking 
Guns: What Makes Income Inequality Vary Over Time in Different Countries, 64 Am. 
Sociological Review 585 (1999) (explaining different experience with inequality in Sweden, 
the United States and Finland in the 1980s on the basis of differences in trade union 
density). 
22 Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, GROWING PROSPERITY: THE BATTLE FOR GROWTH WITH 
EQUITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 193 (Houghton Mifflin, 2000). 
23 Id. at 196. 
24Frank Levy and Richard J. Murnane, U.S. Earnings Levels and Earnings Inequality: A 
Review of Recent Trends and Proposed Explanations, 30 J. of Econ. Lit 1333, 1347 (1992). INCOME INEQUALITY IN THE DIGITAL ERA 
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productivity grows slowly in service jobs because they are less likely to 
be automated. They are also less likely to be unionized. Thus the shift 
from manufacturing jobs to service jobs since the 1970s has led to more 
blue collar men and women in low-wage service jobs, and hence more 
inequality.
25 
While the shift away from manufacturing accounts for some of the 
increased inequality, it cannot tell the whole story. This is because there 
has been an increase in inequality within the service sector as well as 
within the manufacturing sector. Between 1979 and 1996, both the 
service and the goods producing sectors experienced the same pattern of 
widening disparities. As Frank Levy explains, “In economic terms, there 
was a surge in skill bias in both sectors that widened the earnings gap 
between men who had not gone beyond high school and men who had at 
least some college.”
26 This leads back to the skill-biased technological 
change and the increasing returns to education factors discussed above. 
To the extent that these factors were also found to be incomplete, other 
factors must be explored.  
 
A.II.3.  Income Dispersion Within Firms 
One aspect of the widening income distribution that is inconsistent with 
the increasing-returns-to-education hypothesis is that there has 
reportedly been in increase in earnings inequality within groups that are 
similar as to age, education, occupation, and other observable 
characteristics. Several economists have hypothesized that there has 
been a growth in wage dispersion within industries, and even within 
firms.
27 
A recent series of case studies financed by the Sloan Foundation test 
the skill-biased technological change thesis by exploring the impact of 
technological change on industry and firm-level income distribution. 
These researchers found that in industries that experienced technological 
change in the past twenty years, technological factors were not the sole, 
or even dominant, cause of either widening income disparities or lowering 
incomes at the bottom tiers. Rather, several found that changing work 
practices are a significant factor in explaining widening income 
disparities.
28  
Clair Brown and Ben Campbell, for example, found that amongst 
                                                 
25 Frank Levy, THE NEW DOLLARS AND DREAMS, 60-62.  
26 Id. at 62. 
27 For a summary of some of these studies, see Levy and Murname, Earnings Levels and 
Earnings Inequality, 30 J. of Econ. Lit. 1333, 1367 (1992).  
28 Harry C, Katz, Industry Studies of Wage Inequality: Symposium Introduction, 54 Indus. & 
Labor Relations Rev. 399 (2001).                                               KATHERINE V.W. STONE 
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semiconductor fabrication plants, there has been considerable 
technological change that upgraded some skills and down-graded others. 
Brown and Campbell also found a shift to the use of higher-skilled 
workers, but they did not find that it was correlated with compensation 
levels or wage differentials. Rather, they found no systematic relationship 
between the implementation of new technologies, the returns to 
education, or wage inequality in the industry. Clair and Campbell 
conclude that the impact of new technology is filtered through a 
company’s culture and overall employment system history.
29  
In a study of employment in the retail food industry, John Budd and 
Brian McCall similarly found that despite considerable technical change 
between 1984 and 1994, wage inequality did not increase. There the new 
technologies, such as the use of scanners at check-out counters, were 
not skill-biased upward, but rather lowered the skill requirements. As a 
result, Budd and McCall found that in grocery stores, deskilling 
technologies led to the lowering of wages throughout the distribution. 
They also found no increased returns to education in the grocery 
industry.
30 This study, like that of the semiconductor industry, 
demonstrate that not all technological change is skill-biased, and even 
when it is, it does not always lead to widening wage differentials 
Thomas Bailey, Peter Berg and Carola Sandy studied the steel and 
apparel industries, where they found that workers in firms that used high 
performance work practices received higher pay. They defined high 
performance practices as participation on self-directed teams, assignment 
to high autonomy work tasks, and opportunities to communicate across 
departmental boundaries. Bailey, Berg, & Sandy found that those workers 
who were on self-directed teams or engaged in other high performance 
practices received not only higher pay, but also more variability in the 
pay. They posit that these results could be explained by the fact those 
workers in the high performance settings were given greater training 
and/or because employers used the incentives to elicit greater 
discretionary effort.
31  
Some of the researchers in the Sloan project found that skill-biased 
technological change can have an indirect effect on income inequality. 
                                                 
29 Clair Brown and Ben Campbell, Technological Change, Wages, and Employment in 
Semiconductor Manufacturing, 54 Indus. & Labor Relations Rev. 450, 463 (2001). 
30 John W. Budd and Brian P. McCall, The Grocery Store Wage Distribution: A Semi-
Parametric Analysis of the Role of Retailing and Labor Market Institutions, 54 Indus. & Labor 
Relations Rev. 484 (2001). 
31 Thomas Bailey, Peter Berg, and Carola Sandy, The Effect of High-Performance Work 
Practices on Employee Earnings in the Steel, Apparel, and Medical Electronics and Imaging 
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Rosemary Batt, for example, found that for telecommunications services 
and sales workers, there has been significant wage dispersal since the 
break-up of the Bell system in 1983. In the same period, the introduction 
of new technologies have made many new marketing and service 
offerings possible. Analyzing data from 354 service and sales centers, 
Batt concluded that business strategy and human resource policies were 
more significant than skill-biased technology per se in explaining patterns 
of wage inequality. For example, she found that firms engaged in what 
she terms “customer segmentation” – a practice separating residential 
and business consumers, and differentiating between high volume and 
low volume business consumers. The firms she studied hired workers 
with high school degrees to service residential consumers, but only hired 
college graduates to service large businesses. They did so because they 
believed that the latter customers required service personnel with greater 
skills in manipulating information systems and more adept at social 
interaction. These latter workers have higher human capital and provide 
higher value added, and accordingly showed significantly higher earnings. 
Batt concludes that the business strategy of customer segmentation 
might be an indirect mechanism through which skill-based technical 
change is translated into wage differentials.
32 Batt also found significant 
wage differentiation between call center establishments. Establishments 
that utilized variable pay and other high performance work practices had 
higher overall wage levels than those that did not.  
The impact of changing work practices on intra-firm wage structures is 
illustrated most vividly in a case study by Larry Hunter, et. al. on human 
resource practices in the banking industry in the 1980s and 1990s. In 
that period, banks were adopting a host of new technologies, such as new 
hardware and software systems for handling accounts and ATMs for 
customer service. Also in that period, deregulation led to greater 
consolidation in the industry and intensified price competition among 
banks. With the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 199?, banks and other 
financial institutions were able to diversify their services, so that banks 
began to compete with brokerage houses and mutual funds to sell 
investment products as well as checking accounts and loans
33 
Hunter and his co-authors report on the human resource restructuring 
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undertaken by two banks in the face of this increased competition and 
technological change. In both banks, there was a growing gap in the 
functions and the earnings between the bank tellers and the “platform 
workers,” the people who open accounts or receive loan applications.   
Tellers remained responsible for providing routine services such as check 
cashing, while the job of the platform worker was redefined. Those in the 
latter jobs, renamed “Personal Banker” or “Financial Specialist,” became 
responsible for promoting sales of a variety of banking products and 
providing financial counseling to high-yield customers who required 
personalized services. To appeal to the high-end of the customer 
population, the banks required a college degree for the position. They 
selected polished workers with a professional demeanor for these new 
positions. These newly professionalized jobs paid considerably higher 
than the teller jobs. Thus like Batt’s call center workers, the banks’ 
impetus to hire college graduates was not skill-biased technological 
change but rather a desire to engage in strategic customer segmentation, 
by which the more profitable customers were routed to the more 
professional types of workers.
34  
In one respect, the trend of customer segmentation and the 
preference for college-educated workers to service profitable customers 
reported by both Hunter and Batt is a feedback loop in the widening 
income distribution story. As firms confront a more income-dispersed 
customer base, they adopt marketing practices that further disperses the 
income distribution.  
These studies and others of their ilk suggest that the adoption of the 
high performance work practices of the boundaryless workplace operate 
independently of, but often in conjunction with, technological change to 
provide at least a partial explanation for the rising inequality of the past 
twenty years. When jobs are redesigned to provide greater flexibility, 
their skill requirements also increase. When this occurs, changes in firm-
level income distribution that mirrors changing differential skill levels is a 
response not to changing technology but to new employment practices.
35  
 
A.II.4 The Impact of Digital-Era Employment Practices on Wage 
Inequality 
It stands to reason that a departure from internal labor markets leads to 
more dispersion in pay levels. In internal labor markets, wages were not 
set by the external labor market, but rather by institutional factors such 
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as seniority and longevity. Internal labor markets, like labor unions, thus 
have been a force for wage compression as well as a cushion from 
external labor market forces. The dismantlement of internal labor 
markets together with the decline in unions removes  pressure for wage 
compression. Instead, wages are increasingly pegged to other factors. 
There are two respects in which the new workplace produces widening 
disparities in income, between and within categories of workers, and 
between as well as within firms.
36 First, new compensation practices such 
as incentive pay schemes, skill-based pay, and market based pay almost 
by definition generate wide pay differentials within firms. In jobs where 
performance is highly variable, the trend is to base wages on individual 
performance wherever possible. Thus in today’s workplace it is not 
uncommon for workers doing identical tasks to have different pay.
37 In 
jobs where performance is routine and predictable, benchmarking can be 
used to set wages according to the going rate for the particular job, and 
thus break the lock-step wage patterns of internal labor market or union 
compensation schedules. 
Benchmarking, which began as a technique for evaluating work design 
and enhancing technical efficiencies, has also become a mechanism by 
which compensation levels are reassessed and pegged to market rates. 
With benchmarking, an expert identifies discrete tasks or functions that 
are performed within a firm and compares them to the same functions in 
other firms. The comparison yields information about work design and 
also about costs. Thus, firms can compare their labor costs for a 
particular portion of their work processes. A firm can identify the“going 
rate” for a particular collection of tasks, and then apply that rate inside 
its own operations so as to set the rate for those jobs in accordance with 
the external market. Benchmarking thus removes the protective shield of 
internal wage-setting devices and makes workers within the firm 
vulnerable to competition from similarly tasked workers on the outside. 
In other words, benchmarking imports the wage dispersion of the 
external labor market into the wage structure of the firm.
38 
The second respect in which new employment practices generate intra-
firm inequality is through the talent wars to obtain superstars. As Robert 
Frank and Philip Cook have documented, a large number of occupations 
have become “winner-take-all markets” in which the very best commands 
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a price far beyond that of its nearest competitors.
39 The top firms want 
those top performers and are willing to pay a disproportionate price to 
get them. As part of the talent wars, firms use the carrot of off-the-scale 
salaries and generous compensation packages to lure and retain those it 
sees as top perfomers, regardless of the impact such big disparities could 
have on others. Over time, such practices lead to vast disparities 
between employees at the same level as similarly situated employees are 
differentially rewarded.
40 The talent wars also foster gaping earnings 
disparities between individuals in different levels, because the more 
highly skilled occupations are those in which competition for talent are 
most aggressive.  
Thus current digital era human resource practices are contributing to 
income inequality. Both the tendencies toward wage dispersion within 
firms and toward income tournaments at the top are features of the new 
workplace that accelerate the other processes generating income 
inequality.  
 
A.II.5. The Impact of Globalized Production on Income Inequality 
While changing human resource practices and skill-biased technological 
change are factors in the widening income distribution, so too is the 
increase in global production and the policies of trade liberalization. With 
increased global trade and the relaxation of import barriers, goods 
produced with low-cost labor are able to out-compete domestically-
manufactured items. As a result, domestic low wage workers are forced 
to compete with low wage workers in developing countries for jobs. The 
same results flow from direct foreign investment and the use of foreign 
subcontractors, in which domestic manufacturers shift production to low-
wage countries for those part of their operations that can utilize foreign, 
low-wage labor. Workers for any company whose goods are traded in the 
global market, or whose company makes goods that compete with goods 
traded in the global market, is vulnerable to downward pressure on 
wages.
41 According to Bluestone and Harrison, “To the extent that 
companies move their facilities to take advantage of cheaper unskilled 
labor or outsource domestic production to cheaper offshore sites, 
transnational investment adds to the effective supply of low-skilled labor 
available to American firms, accelerating the entire dis-equalizing 
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process.”
42 M.I.T. economist Frank Levy claims that increased global 
trade has two effects on wages. It both decreases the demand for blue 
collar workers domestically, and it makes the demand for all types of 
employment –white and blue collar alike – more elastic because firms 
have greater freedom to substitute overseas production for domestic 
production. In both respects, global trade increases job insecurity and 
strengthens management’s bargaining power vis-a-vis all but the most 
highly skilled employees.
43   
David Howell also argues that trade liberalization enhances inequality 
because it leads to more global wage competition for low-skilled labor. He 
contends that the more certain types of labor can be outsourced or are 
otherwise exposed to low-wage, foreign competition, the more firms will 
be tempted and able to reduce the wage for that type of labor. This can 
explain the observed increases in intra-firm wage as well as overall wage 
differentials. According to Howell, “Jobs least sheltered from downward 
pressures (those least difficult to outsource, that require no idiosyncratic 
skills, etc.) experience declining relative (and real) earnings.”
44  
The factors of technological change, new employment practices and 
global production are often inter-related. Several economists have found 
that flexible wage practices are most frequently adopted by firms that are 
most exposed to foreign trade.
45 For example, Princeton economist 
Marianne Bertrand finds that companies that face competitive pressures 
from the global marketplace have adopted flexible wage policies.
46 A 
study of British confectionary companies also found that those firms 
whose products competed in a global market were more likely to adopt 
the boundaryless job structures.
47 That is, increasing global competition 
subjects many firms to increased market pressure, that in turn induces 
them to adopt the kinds of boundaryless work practices that involve a 
dispersal of firm-level incomes. And as firms dismantle internal labor 
markets and rely on an external labor market for their hiring needs, they 
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have less incentive to protect their workers from the dynamic of decline.  
 
A.III  Rising Income Inequality: Why Explanations Matter 
A multi-factored understanding of rising inequality means that no one 
public policy can reverse the dynamic. If skill-biased technological change 
were the whole story, then we might understand the present level of 
income inequality as a transitory phenomenon -- the result of a time lag. 
With the dizzying pace of technical change, the theory suggests, some 
people failed to get skills, or the right skills, to succeed. Whether due to 
individual ineptitude or institutional failure, their poverty is the result of 
inadequate education, training, or talent. The solution, in this view, is to 
improve training and education for the ill-equipped and hope that their 
those coming after them obtain better, or at least more current and 
flexible, skills. 
Once we move beyond the skill-biased explanation to a multi-factored 
one, we are forced to abandon a singular emphasis on training policy and 
instead entertain a wide range of policy proposals at the macro-economic 
and political level. A number of proposals of this sort are presented and 
evaluated in the next section. Before turning to the policy proposals, it is 
necessary to address the argument, frequently asserted, that the trend 
toward more inequality cannot be reversed at all without compromising 
economic growth. 
Many economists argue that unequal income distribution is a 
necessary but regrettable dimension of economic policies that enhance 
growth. In this view, the rise of digital technology, the growth of the 
service sector, trade liberalization, deregulation of domestic economic 
life, new workplace practices and the weakening of labor unions all 
enhance growth and overall welfare, but have a negative impact on 
equality. If so, then it is at least arguable that we must choose between 
overall growth and equality. Or, if we choose growth, at the very least, 
we must identify tools that can compensate for the resulting inequities 
without derailing or diminishing growth.  
Some economists have challenged the growth-inequality syllogism on the 
grounds that in some circumstances, inequality can serve as an 
impediment to growth.
48 Bluestone and Harrison go further, and argue 
that best antidote for rising inequality is to generate more growth. They 
claim that if the government pursued macro-economic policies that 
encouraged economic growth, then eventually much of the present 
income inequality would disappear. They present evidence to show that in 
periods of high growth, the bottom groups in the income distribution fare 
                                                 
48 Kanbur, Thornbeck, Blau & Kahn INCOME INEQUALITY IN THE DIGITAL ERA 
 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona"  12/2002 
19
19 
relatively well. However, they also opine that current policy-makers are 
too obsessed with controlling inflation and supporting moderate growth, 
rather than generating the red-hot growth that would be necessary to 
reverse the dis-equalizing effects of technological change, trade 
liberalization, deunionization, and deindustrialization.
49   
While growth might well be the solution to rising inequality, it is 
necessary to consider other ameliorative policies. As history 
demonstrates, economic growth can be an elusive aspiration, less a 
beacon for policy-makers than a frustrating mirage. Too many other 
factors intervene. Wars, droughts, attacks on the World Trade Center, 
foreign currency crises, and shifting political winds all affect economic 
growth. There is no simple formula for success. So while growth, or 
rather equitable growth, can be a powerful antidote to rising income 
inequality, other policies must also be considered. To those we now turn.  
 
B. Promoting Equality, Opportunity, and Stability 
in the Digital Workplace 
 
Growing inequality threatens the integrity and moral authority of the 
social order. Those locked out of the world of economic opportunity are 
locked into a perpetual underclass, often exhibiting anti-social behaviors 
such as drug use, alcoholism, and crime. The social problems that result 
from the widening chasm between social strata can undermine the 
legitimacy of our governmental institutions. If, as I argued above, the 
emerging digital era job structures play a role in generating income 
inequality, then we must confront a choice. We can redress inequality by 
seeking to arrest the spread of new workplace practices or we can 
develop a plausible macro-economic and political program for 
redistribution. The former approach would probably be futile as well as 
detrimental to overall growth – a sort of Twentieth-First Century 
Ludditism. Instead, it is more feasible to devise policies to redress the 
rising inequality and vulnerability that are created by the new work 
practices. To preserve an acceptable level of equality and cohesion in 
society, redistribution need to be placed prominently on the national 
political agenda.  
There are a myriad of proposals currently circulating to address the 
widening income distribution, many of which have been tried in some 
form or other in recent years. The most frequently discussed reform 
proposals are: increasing the minimum wage, expanding the earned 
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income tax credit, providing wage subsidies, providing cash grants to the 
poor, and establishing a system of universal citizen stakeholding. The 
first three are redistributive measures that are employment-centered and 
require participation in the labor market by beneficiaries, while the latter 
two are redistributive measures that operate independently of labor 
market participation. In this chapter, I describe and evaluate each of 
these. I then discuss proposals that, while not explicitly redistributive, are 
designed to give individuals the flexibility they need to participate in 
today’s labor market. These include proposals for training, child care, and 
insurance portability. I also present a European proposal that employees 
be able to accumulate “social drawing rights” that they can use to ease 
career transitions. This proposal is designed to help individuals cope with 
the insecurity that results from the flexibilization of work. While these 
latter proposals do not directly address issues of income distribution, they 
would help individuals navigate and prosper in the new labor market. I 
conclude that these types of proposals, combined with some of the more 
explicitly redistributional ones, are necessary to address the twin 
problems of worker vulnerability and deteriorating  income distribution in 
the digital era. 
 
B.I  Redistribution Through the Labor Market 
 
B.I.1 The Minimum Wage 
One of the best known social programs for redistributing  income is the 
minimum wage.  Enacted in 1935 as part of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 
the federal minimum wage sets a floor for wage rates for all employees 
whose job is involved in interstate commerce.
50 While the minimum wage 
level has been raised from time to time, it is not indexed for inflation. The 
level of the minimum wage level peaked in 1969 at over $7.50 per hour 
in 1999 dollars, but has never came close to that level since. The 
minimum wage declined sharply in the 1980s because Congress failed to 
adjust it for nine years, reaching a low in 1989. There were several 
increases in the minimum wage in the 1990s that somewhat reversed the 
trend. However, even with the increases of the 1990s, inflation has so 
eroded the minimum wage that today it is21 per cent lower than it was in 
1979.
51  
The federal minimum wage has long been popular with the public but 
anathema to economists. Mainstream economists contend that the 
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minimum wage raises wages above the competitive level, thereby 
causing employers to reduce employment. This results in a loss in 
employment opportunities for workers whose value to employers is less 
than the legislatively set minimum, and it also results in a sub-optimal 
level of output. Thus the criticisms of the minimum wage are primarily 
directed at its efficiency-defeating impact. 
Economists David Card and Alan Krueger conducted an empirical study 
of fast food industry workers that challenged the claim that increases in 
the minimum wage will lead to declines in employment opportunities. 
Prior to 1992, New Jersey and Pennsylvania had the same minimum 
wage. But when the minimum was raised in New Jersey in 1992 without a 
raise in Pennsylvania, Card and Kreuger found that the predicted drop in 
employment in the New Jersey fast food restaurants did not materialize. 
Rather, employment in the New Jersey establishments increased relative 
to those in Pennsylvania. This led them to hypothesize that sometimes 
small increases in the minimum wage could lead to expanded 
employment opportunities and thus to increased efficiency.
52  
The Card and Kreuger finding initially generated considerable 
controversy within the economics profession because it appeared to 
challenge one of the basic tenets of the neoclassical model. However, 
many economists have come to concede that modest increases in the 
minimum wage appear might not be detrimental to employment. This 
may be particularly true in an period in which the minimum wage has 
failed to rise with inflation. If the minimum wage is set at a level below 
the competitive wage rate, then arguably increases would not lead to 
employment losses.
53  
For present purposes, the efficiency effects of the minimum wage are 
not as important as its distributional effects. The widespread popularity 
amongst the public of the minimum wage stems not from its impact on 
overall production but from its impact on wages. It is widely believed that 
the minimum wage causes wages to rise above the level they would 
otherwise be, and that a raise in the minimum wage would raise wages 
even higher. Card and Kreuger tested this hypothesis by looking at the 
distributional impact of the increase in the federal minimum wage in 1990 
and 1991. They found that the raise in the minimum wage, while small, 
provided a significant boost to the economic well-being of many low-
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income earners.
54 They also found that the 1990 and 1991 increases in 
the minimum wage affected overall income distribution. They report that 
the increases “rolled back a significant fraction of the cumulative rise in 
wage dispersion from 1979 to 1989 . . . [and] led to significant increases 
in the 10
th percentile of family earnings, and to a narrowing of the gap 
between the 90
th and 10
th percentiles of family earnings.”
55 Rebecca 
Blank similarly found that the increases in the federal minimum wage in 
1996 and 1997 also helped low income families.
56  
These findings support the popular belief that the minimum wage is an 
effective mechanism for redistributing income toward the lower end of 
the income distribution. None of these studies demonstrate that increases 
in the minimum wage help eliminate poverty. Because less than half of 
the poor work, and because those that do work often work part-time or 
intermittently, increases in the minimum wage do not translate into 
significantly higher incomes for the poor. Rather, the minimum wage is 
best understood as a means of protecting the wages and labor standards 
of the working poor, who otherwise could face a downward spiral as 
employers bid down the price of labor of those working at or near the 
bottom of the income distribution.
57  
 
B.I.2 The Earned Income Tax Credit 
The largest federal redistribution program presently is the earned income 
tax credit (EITC). The EITC benefits primarily the working poor – the 
fastest growing portion of the labor force. It is a refundable tax credit for 
low income working families with children. Eligible individuals who earn 
less than the specified target amount get a tax credit for each dollar 
earned up to a set maximum benefit. The credit can be either a reduction 
in tax liability, or if liability is less than the credit, a check from the IRS 
for the difference. At present, a family with two or more children with 
parents working at the minimum wage would receive a rebate through 
the EITC that would be the equivalent of a $2 per hour increase in pay.  
Between 1975 when the EITC began until 1999, the size of the program 
grew from $3.9 billion to $31.9 billion. It is currently the largest federal 
welfare program in the United States, dwarfing other federal programs 
for the poor, such as food stamps that came to $19 billion in 1999, and 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) that came to $16.7 
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billion in 1999. Unlike these other welfare programs, the EITC enjoys 
considerable popular and political support. It is widely regarded as a 
successful anti-poverty program that includes work incentives. In 1998, 
the EITC raised an estimated 4.4 million Americans above the poverty 
line.
58 
The original EITC, proposed by Senator Long in 1975, gave taxpayers 
with children a ten percent supplement for wages up to $4000, and 
phased out the supplement for incomes between $4000 and $8000.  The 
EITC remained essentially unchanged until the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 
when the amount of the supplement was increased to equal its real value 
in 1975, with indexing for future inflation. The EITC was expanded again 
in 1990, as part of the overall tax bill that raised rates and limited 
deductions for high income taxpayers. Congress further expanded the 
EITC on several occasions in the 1990s, with the goal of using the credit 
to raise every full-time wage  workers’ pay to the poverty level. In 1998, 
it was modified to provide a modest amount of benefit for taxpayers 
without children. At present, a wage-earner with two children earning 
$8500 a year can receive approximately $3370, bringing them above the 
poverty line.
59  
The EITC is widely viewed as a valuable policy tool for redressing 
inequality. Rebecca Blank says the expansion of the EITC in the 1990s 
“may be the most important anti-poverty policy implemented during this 
decade.”
60  Timothy Bartik says there is “little doubt that the EITC’s effect 
is to truly raise net wages after taxes for many of the working poor.”
61 
Barry Bluestone and Teresa Ghilarducci state that the ETIC not only 
raises wages, but also provides “wage insurance for the temporary poor 
in an era of job instability and earnings insecurity.” They contend that 
EITC benefits not only the entrenched underclass of long-term 
unemployed, but also those whose wages are falling or who are at risk of 
temporary unemployment due to corporate restructuring.  
Some economists have expressed concern that the EITC could lower 
wages by inducing employers to hire the same workforce for less and 
simply letting the government pay the difference. In that event, the EITC 
would prove to be a subsidy for low-wage employers. However, to 
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counter that potential negative consequence, Bluestone and Ghilarducci 
argue that the EITC should be combined with raising the minimum wage 
and indexing it for inflation.
62 Rebecca Blank also advocates that the EITC 
should be expanded and combined with an increased minimum wage.   
She warns that increases in the minimum wage alone could lead to 
increased unemployment. However, if raising the wage floor were 
combined with an expansion of the EITC, Blank contends that the latter 
policy would induce more nonworkers to join the labor force, and thus the 
combination could combat the negative employment effects of the 
former. She advocates such a combination because it “makes full-time, 
full-year work much more attractive.”
63  
Francine Blau and Lawrence Kahn also argue that the EITC is a 
valuable approach to ameliorating income inequality, but they see it as 
an alternative rather to than as a complement to the minimum wage. 
Blau and Kahn analyze the minimum wage, as do most economists, as a 
policy that distorts the labor market and reduces employment 
opportunities at the bottom. They prefer the EITC because it raises after-
tax wages of low income workers without interfering in the labor market. 
It enables employers to hire more workers without increasing their 
employers’ labor costs, and thus unlike the minimum wage, it would not 
induce employers to reduce employment levels.
64  
Whether or not it is combined with a minimum wage hike, the earned 
income tax credit has the potential to redistribute income to the lower 
end of the income distribution. If it were expanded, it could have 
significant redistributive impact. Further, because its benefits are based 
on annual income, it assists individuals who move in and out of the labor 
market during the course of the year, making it a redistribution program 
that addresses the precarious employment experience of the digital era.  
The EITC is not beyond criticism, however. It is expensive, and if it 
were expanded it would cost even more. And because benefits are only 
paid once a year as an income tax refund, the credit does not provide 
cash for emergencies. Its lump sum pay-out can also dampen the 
program’s ability to encourage recipients to seek full-time work. Also, the 
program has lower than expected participation rates, presumably 
because there are many who would be eligible who do not file income tax 
returns. In addition, it has a high error rate, again possibly attributable to 
                                                 
62 Barry Bluestone and Teresa Ghilarducci, Making Work Pay: Wage Insurance for the 
Working Poor, 28/ 1996 Public Policy Brief (1996). 
63 Blank, IT TAKES A NATION, supra. at 114-116. 
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the complex IRS forms that need to be completed to obtain benefits.   
Many of these short-comings could be cured with better information and 
more user-friendly filing requirements.  
  
B.I.3 Wage Subsidies 
 
a. Targeted Subsidies 
Rather than give subsidies to employees to bring their earnings above the 
poverty level as the EITC does, some analysts have proposed a 
government subsidy paid to employers to raise the wages of low-income 
workers. In the past, wage subsidies have been used to assist certain 
targeted groups for a limited period of time.  In 1979, Congress enacted 
the Target Jobs Tax Credit, and in 1996 it enacted the Work Opportunity 
Tax Credit, both of which gave private-sector employers a subsidy to 
employ certain targeted groups, such as welfare recipients, 
disadvantaged youths, and ex-criminals. The results of these programs 
were mixed. Several researchers found that they had a negative effect on 
the employment of the targeted workers. They surmised that the subsidy 
stigmatized the targeted job-seekers and thus made employers reluctant 
to hire them despite the financial inducement to do so. According to 
economist and former Clinton appointee, Lawrence Katz, sending in a 
welfare recipient to a job interview with a wage subsidy voucher is like 
saying, “‘Hi. I’m a lemon -- give me a job!”’ Others, however, claim that 
the stigma factor was exaggerated, and some have found that the 
programs yielded positive effects on the job opportunities of some 
categories of disadvantaged workers.
65 
 
b. The Phelps Proposal 
One of the most ambitious wage subsidy proposals has been put forward 
by  Edmund Phelps in his 1997 book, REWARDINGWORK. Phelps’ proposal is 
aimed to assist all who lie at the bottom of the income distribution. 
Rather than a time-limited and target wage subsidy, Phelps proposes a 
universal, unlimited one. It is an ambitious and expensive program, 
costing taxpayers an estimated $125 billion in 1997 -- up to$132 in 1998. 
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This enormous sum, he claims would be offset by increased taxes and by 
the savings from reduced crime, unemployment benefits, Medicaid, 
welfare payments, and the elimination of the EITC.
66 
Phelps’ proposal grows out of his analysis of income inequality. He 
points out that in 1990, those in the bottom tenth of the income 
distribution -- some 12 million in all -- earned less than $4 an hour and, 
due to part-time work and/or spells of unemployment, had annual 
earnings of $1,200 on average. The next portion of the income 
distribution did not do much better. Phelps calculates that those in the 
bottom third of the income distribution suffer from serious economic 
disadvantage.
67 In addition to the concern about absolute deprivation, 
Phelps maintains that it is important to redress the relative deprivation of 
low-paid workers. As he says, “The pay of America’s lowest lifetime 
earners has become so remote from the pay of the median earner as to 
make them a class apart, with radically diminished possibilities next to 
those in the mainstream.”
68 
Phelps attributes the problem of low wages of the working poor to 
their low productivity.
69 In addition, he contends, the advent of 
information-intensive production increases the low-wage workers’ 
disadvantage. The less well-educated are not likely to be selected for jobs 
that involve handling and/or processing information, so that “the flow of 
new technical information widens the gap between low-wage and median-
wage workers.” Similarly, employers are unwilling to invest in training for 
low-educated workers, so their relative disadvantage in the labor market 
increases. For these reasons, Phelps argues, neither traditional welfare 
programs nor employment-based social insurance can reverse the low-
wage cycle of low-educated workers.
70  
Instead of programs that ameliorate the problems of the nonworking 
poor, Phelps proposes a solution for the working poor: that the federal 
government pay employers to raise the wages of their low-income 
employees. For example, an employer whose employees cost $4 an hour 
in wages, benefits, and payroll taxes would receive a subsidy from the 
state to bring up that workers wages to some set minimum amount, 
posited at $7. To avoid perverse incentives, he proposes that the subsidy 
be structured to decline as hourly wages increase. As Phelps explains, 
“The subsidy is thus like a matching grant rewarding the firm for as many 
workers as it employs, particularly workers whose private productivity is 
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low (as evidenced by the low hourly labor cost that firms are willing to 
incur for their services).”
71  
Unlike the targeted wage subsidy programs attempted in the past, 
Phelps’ proposal would give subsidies to employers of all types of low-
wage workers. He claims that the subsidy would not only pull up wage 
rates, but also reduce unemployment by giving employers an incentive to 
hire some whom they would not have employed otherwise. He justifies 
the subsidies on the ground that existing wages reflect only a worker’s 
private productivity to an individual employer. The subsidy, on the other 
hand, would bring up the wage to his “social productivity” – the 
contribution of the employee to society.
72 Phelps explains that the 
employment has third party effects that go beyond the private benefit 
conferred on the worker and the employer. The social benefit of 
employment is the benefit workers confer on the rest of society “from 
their position as participants in the business life of their community and 
the country, earning their own keep and supporting their children and 
setting an example for others growing up in their neighborhood.”
73 
Ideally, he says, the size of the income subsidy should make the wage 
equal to the worker’s external productivity– the private benefit and the 
social benefit that the worker provides. In this way, he argues, wage 
subsidies would have benefits for the taxpayers who would be called upon 
to pay for the proposal.  
Phelps’ proposal conditions the subsidy on having a job. He justifies 
this approach by arguing that a redistributive program should encourage 
labor market participation because employment is more than a means of 
self-support -- it is a form of personal development and community 
building. Phelps is critical of proposals for redistribution that give people 
an incentive not to join the labor force, and thus “do nothing to restore 
jobholding as the means of self-support and the vehicle for personal 
growth and the sense of belonging and being needed.”
74  
 
c. Critiques of Wage Subsidies 
A number of analysts have voiced criticisms of wage subsidies. Some 
have criticized the Phelp’s wage subsidy proposal for its extremely high 
cost. While it is predicted to produce large increases in both employment 
and wages, the price tag of over $132 billion makes it an expensive 
gamble should such positive results not be forthcoming.
75  
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Yale Law School Professor, Anne Alstott, has attacked wages subsidies 
of all types.
76 She argues that targeted subsidies have multiple failures, 
including encouraging displacement of nontargeted workers, stigmatizing 
the targeted workers, creating perverse incentives for employers to 
engage in workforce churning, and incurring high administrative costs. 
Unlike these, she says, the Phelps’ proposal is elegantly simple, 
ambitious, and bold.
77 By giving coverage to all low wage workers 
throughout the workers’ entire career, the Phelps’ plan solves many of 
the administrative problems and creates fewer perverse incentives than 
more limited and targeted wage incentive programs. 
Despite such praise, Alstott is sharply critical of Phelps’ proposal. She 
contends that by requiring work, the program could discourage 
individuals from obtaining additional education and training and hence 
could impede their labor market opportunities in the future. In addition, 
she argues that the program is not well targeted. Because it gives 
subsidies to all low-wage earners, it assists middle-class teens and 
secondary earners as well as the poor. Third, she claims the program has 
serious administrative costs because employers will have an incentive to 
fraudulently understate wages and overstate hours. Fourth, she claims 
that employers will have an incentive to displace higher paid workers with 
lower paid ones. Fifth, the program gives workers a disincentive to move 
to higher wage positions because, while they will earn more, the marginal 
gain will be small. And finally, because the program assists employers 
who can utilize low-wage workers, she claims it will aid employees in the 
suburbs more than those in the cities.  
While Alstott characterizes these problems as “damaging facts,”
78 it 
would be equally plausible to see the m  a s  c h a l l e n g e s  t o  b e  f a c e d  i n  
program design. None seem as damaging to society as the existing 
maldistribution of income. Indeed, some of her objections seem 
exaggerated. For example, any disincentive that a wage subsidy raised to 
participation in training programs could be more than offset by the 
enhancement to an individual’s labor market opportunities that follows 
from actual labor force participation.  
As to claim that the proposal causes geographic distortion, it is not 
necessarily bad economics for firms that have lower labor costs to locate 
on the periphery of cities. Regional economists have found that in 
information-intensive economies, cities have agglomeration economies in 
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producer service sectors, not in manufacturing.
79 Further, there are many 
low wage jobs in cities -- such as low-skilled jobs in hotel, restaurants, 
and hospitals -- that would be candidates for Phelps’ wage subsidies.  
Alstott’s concern about fraud is serious but not unique to the wage 
subsidy proposal. Potential for fraud has plagued tax programs and social 
welfare programs for years, and the antidote is for Congress to design 
and fund meaningful compliance systems. Although Alstott quite rightly 
states that the Phelps proposal would require accurate information on 
employers’ wage rates and hours worked, it seems like a reporting 
system for that purpose could be designed. While one can take issue with 
Alstott over whether the wage subsidy glass is half full or half empty, she 
has a more fundamental critique of the wage subsidy program. Her main 
argument is that assistance that is conditioned on employment interferes 
with an individual’s freedom to determine one’s own trade-off between 
remunerative and nonremunerative activities. According to Alcott, there is 
no reason to privilege labor market participation – some individuals may 
want or need to spend their time taking care of children or pursuing other 
objectives. To enable individuals to make a choice about how to spend 
their time, Alstott advocates a program of cash allowances, or a negative 
income tax for the poor, as preferable forms of redistribution. I address 
Alstott’s liberty-based argument later in this chapter, in the context of a 
discussion of cash grants to the poor.  
 
B.I.4 Comparing the EITC with the Wage Subsidy Proposal 
Assuming that both the EITC and the Phelps’ wage subsidy proposal are 
viable mechanisms for redistributing income, the question remains, which 
is preferable. As Lawrence Katz notes, “In a simple Coasian world without 
transaction costs or imperfect information, it should not matter whether 
wage subsidies are provided to employers or equivalent earnings 
supplements provided to workers.” But Katz goes on to say, “There are 
many reasons why the side of the market in which the subsidy is 
provided could matter in practice.”
80  
One way that the side of the market matters is that targeted wage 
subsidies paid to employers identify who is being subsidized and implicitly 
suggests they are bad workers. The EITC, by ensuring payments to the 
employees directly, avoids any stigmatizing effects of targeted wage 
subsidies. But, Phelps’ proposal for a universal low-wage subsidy avoids 
the problem as well. 
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The two programs potentially differ in terms of the economic 
incentives and effects they create. Where there is in effect a minimum 
wage acts that is a constraint on the downward movement of wages, 
employee-side subsidies such as the EITC can raise earnings effectively 
because employers cannot simply reduce wages to offset the amount of 
the subsidy. Yet without the ability to reduce wages, employers may not 
have an incentive to increase employment. Conversely, in the presence of 
a constraining minimum wage, employer-side wage subsidies can permit 
employers to lower wages when they could not have done so previously 
without violating the minimum wage. In that event, the subsidy could 
have the effect of lowering wages but increasing employment. Thus the 
choice between the programs might turn on which is the dominant 
objective.  
It has also been argued that the two types of subsidies differ in terms 
of their ability to target benefits to the intended beneficiaries. Wage 
subsidies paid to employers of low-wage workers could have the 
unintended effect of assisting many who are not truly needy. Low wage 
workers include teenagers and secondary earners in middle class 
households. In this light, the EITC is preferable because it operates 
through the income tax, which is a more reliable mechanism for 
identifying the needy.
81 By operating through the income tax system, the 
EITC might also be preferable to employer-paid subsidies in terms of ease 
of administration and discouragement of cheating, although the case is 
by no means clear.
82  
There is a danger that any form of wage subsidy will induce employers 
to lower wages and then hire subsidized workers to replace unsubsidized 
ones, thereby giving the employer a windfall rather than raising the low-
wage worker’s earnings. This danger is more serious with the Phelps plan 
than the EITC. With the Phelps plan, the employer knows which workers 
are eligible for the subsidy, and can downwardly adjust their wages to 
offset the subsidy while keeping the unsubsidized workers pay at a level 
sufficient to keep them employed. With the EITC, the employer does not 
know which workers are subsidized, because the employer does not know 
the workers’ total family income. In that case, if the employer lowers 
wages, it risks losing its unsubsidized workers who will refuse to work at 
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the lower pay rate. The fact that employers cannot know which worker is 
eligible for the subsidy under the EITC is therefore an advantage in the 
ability of the subsidy to actually raise wages of the program’s 
beneficiaries.
83  
There is one additional factor that argues in favor of the EITC over wage 
subsidies. As Alstott points out, the Phelps proposal would only assist full-
time workers, and thus would impose a full-time work requirement on its 
beneficiaries. The EITC, on the other hand, assists those whose work is 
part-time. Thus the EITC permits workers to retain the benefit while 
adjusting their work schedules to their own life exigencies. For these 
reasons, Alstott claims, the EITC at least partially realizes her goal of 
perserving each individual’s freedom to spend their time as they choose. 
In addition, as Bluestone and Ghilarducci point out, the EITC benefit is 
triggered by low income rather than low pay, so that it assists workers 
who suffer temporary layoffs or other employment transitions. Thus it is 
responsive not only to the low pay, but also to the other vicissitudes and 
vulnerabilities of the boundaryless workplace. 
 
B.II Non-Workplace  Centered  Redistributive Measures 
Some policy analysts propose that the problem of growing inequality be 
addressed through measures that provide cash grants to those outside 
the labor market or on the lowest rungs without conditioning benefits on 
labor market participation.  Some advocate a return to the federal 
welfare program, AFDC, that Congress abolished in 1996, a system that 
focused assistance on the nonworking poor with dependent children. Yet 
others propose a negative income tax -- using the tax system to provide 
cash grants to the working and nonworking poor, with a phase-out of the 
benefit as income rises. Yet others have proposed a stakeholder program 
that would give a cash grant to every young adult in the country upon the 
attainment of majority, financed by the federal income tax. Unlike the 
proposals discussed in the previous section, these proposals do not 
condition public assistance on participation in the labor market.
84 
 
B.II.1 Cash Grants 
The policy of giving public assistance to the disadvantaged goes back 
many centuries and has taken many forms. In the United States, since 
the 1930s there has been a federal welfare program that provides cash 
grants to the disadvantaged.  The Social Security Act of 1935 contained a 
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program called Aid to Dependent Children, later remained Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC), that provided cash grants to poor 
women to enable them to stay out of the labor market to raise children. 
The program was expanded considerably during the Great Society’s war 
on poverty in the 1960s and 70s, and in the 1970s it was supplemented 
by a federal program to provide Food Stamps to the needy. However, as 
welfare was expanding, it also began to lose political support. By the 
1980s and 90s, American values had shifted considerably, so that the 
goal of keeping women out of the labor force in order to raise children 
was no longer palatable to large numbers of the population. Rather, 
women who were on welfare were stigmatized, seen as lazy, 
opportunistic, or simply caught in a cycle of dependency. By the mid-
1990s, political support had evaporated for “welfare as we know it.”
85   
In 1996, Congress repealed AFDC and replaced it with the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act, which established a program 
called Temporary Aid for Needy Families, or “TANF.” TANF rejected the 
premise that public assistance should be a source of long-term support 
for the needy, and instead adopted the premise that it should be a 
transition into the labor force. Accordingly, TANF places a five year 
lifetime time limit for an individual receiving federal welfare, and requires 
states to pressure recipients to find work. The program operates through 
block grants to the states and gives them wide discretion about how to 
structure their welfare programs.
86 Under TANF, states have broad 
discretion to decide who is eligible for benefits and in what amount. 
However, states are prohibited from giving federal assistance for any 
individual beyond 60 months. In addition, states are required to 
demonstrate that they are attempting to move beneficiaries who have 
been collecting benefits for 24 months into work activities. The states 
face fiscal penalties if they fail to meet specified targets set for the 
percentage of recipients participating in a work or work-related activity. 
Thus, under TANF, public assistance is no longer a universal program of 
aid to the poor. Rather, it is a time-limited safety net for those who fall 
outside the labor market, to tide them over and help them get back in.
87 
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Anne Alstott argues for a return to an outright cash grant program. 
She terms TANF “unconscionable” for imposing a work requirement and a 
time limit on welfare recipients. She argues that both the nonworking and 
the working poor would fare better under a system of unconditional cash 
grants or an negative income tax than they would under a redistributive 
program that requires participation in the labor market, such as the EITC 
or the employment subsidy proposals. Her argument is that cash grants 
give the working poor a choice as to how to allocate their time between 
work and leisure. With a cash grant, a low wage earner can choose to 
enhance her standard of living by working full-time, or choose to live 
frugally and not work at all, or strike some balance in between. According 
t o  A l s t o t t ,  t h i s  k i n d  o f  c h o i c e  i s  a n  i m p o r t a n t  a s p e c t  o f  f r e e d o m .  F o r  
example, a cash grant would give a mother the freedom to choose to 
forgo earnings in order to spend time with her children while her children 
were young, choice that employment subsidy denies.
88  
There is, however, a serious problem with the outright cash assistance 
approach to income redistribution that Alstott does not address.  Since 
the English Poor Laws if not before, public charity has been permeated 
with judgements about the moral character of the poor. Public charity has 
long distinguished between the worthy poor and the unworthy poor in 
determining how to distribute public largesse. This point was made 
comically in the long-running Broadway musical, My Fair Lady, when Eliza 
Doolittle’s ne’er-do-well pauper father, Alfred Doolittle lectures Professor 
Henry Higgins on the plight of the undeserving poor. As Doolittle says, 
speaking from personal knowledge, the lazy, the drunks, and the ne’er-
do-wells, unlike the deserving poor, receive neither charity nor sympathy 
from the public. In a more serious vein, social historian Michael Katz 
writes,  
 
The undeserving poor have a very old history.  They represent the 
enduring attempt to clasisify poor people by merit.  This impulse to 
classify has persisted for centuries partly for reasons of policy. 
Resources are finite.  Neither the state nor private charity can 
distribute them in unlimited quantities to all who might claim need. 
On what principles, then, should assistance be based?  Who should – 
and the more difficult question, who should not – receive help?
89  
 
We see this distinction at work when victims of natural disasters and 
terrorist attacks are treated more generously derelicts and drug addicts. 
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The impulse to distinguish between the worthy from the unworthy poor 
frames modern welfare policies. For example, it is out of scepticism about 
the spending habits of the poor, that public and private charity efforts 
often involve the distribution of goods, such as food, shelter, or clothing, 
rather than distributions of cash. Because of an implicit moral judgment 
that the able-bodied poor are unworthy rather than merely unfortunate, 
public charity has usually been structured not only to provide subsistence 
to the poor, but also to change their behavior, beliefs and character. 
Hence public and private charities often couple assistance with intrusive 
inquiries into the private conduct of recipients. The requirements that the 
recipients of public relief perform work for their dole is justified not 
merely in instrumental terms, but also in moral ones. The working 
population has a deep resentment of those on welfare and it is a moral 
resentment, a belief that “I work, they should work too.”
90  
Because of the history of moralizing and coercion that pervades 
outright cash assistance, it is a program that breeds mutual distrust and 
ill-will between the givers of assistance – i.e., the taxpayers – and the 
recipients – the needy. It fosters not social cohesion, but its opposite. As 
a result, political support for non-work based income redistribution has 
almost entirely evaporated. In this context, it is difficult to see how 
proposals for ameliorating income inequality by increasing cash 
assistance to the needy are likely to succeed.  
In addition, it is not clear that the cash grant approach is ultimately 
beneficial to the poor. Unconditional cash grants create incentives for 
individual to stay out of the labor force. While they may be useful, indeed 
necessary, for certain limited periods to enable care-giving for children or 
aging parents, they are not a means to foster independence and dignity 
over the long term. In today’s world, work plays a central role in one’s 
sense of identity and connection to the larger world that cash assistance 
programs cannot deliver.  
Katherine Newman, in NO SHAME IN MY GAME, paints a vivid portrayal of 
the way work creates personhood and paves the way to fulfillment in our 
society. She interviewed inner city youths in Harlem, New York who held 
jobs at a fast food hamburger establishment. She found that the jobs 
provided them with not only a regular source of income, but also self-
respect, direction, a connection to the larger world, and a means to a 
richer life. For example, one black teenager girl, told her,  
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When I got in there, I realize it’s not what people think. It’s a lot 
more to it than flipping burgers. It’s a real system of business. That’s 
when I really got to see a big corporation at play. I mean, one part of 
it, the foundation of it. Cashiers. The store, how it’s run. Production 
of food, crew workers, service. Things of that nature. That’s when I 
really got into it and understood a lot more.”
91 
 
Newman found that in numerous respects, those in Harlem who have 
jobs inhabit a different world than those who do not. Job-holders not only 
have more money, they have more stability, develop a sense of 
responsibility, and become part of a social system that spans outward 
from the workplace to the larger community. “What they have that their 
nonworking counterparts lack is both the dignity of being employed and 
the opportunity to participate in social activities that increasingly define 
their adult lives. This community gives their lives structure and purpose, 
humor and pleasure, support and understanding in hard times, and a 
backstop that extends beyond the instrumental purposes of a fast food 
restaurant.”
92 Newman concludes by observing that: 
 
Our culture confers honor on those who hold down jobs of any kind 
over those who are outside the labor force. Independence and self-
sufficiency – these are virtues that have no equal in this society. But 
there are other reasons why we value workers besides the fact that 
their earnings keep them above water and therefore less in need of 
help from government, communities, or charities. We also value 
workers because they share certain common views, experiences, and 
expectations. The work ethic is more than an attitude toward earning 
money – it is a disciplined existence, a social life woven around the 
workplace.
93 
 
If we understand work as producing not merely income but, as Newman’s 
work vividly demonstrates, a means to personhood, then it makes sense 
to design public redistributive policies to further rather than hinder that 
goal. Public largesse is not infinite, so if our redistributive dollars are 
spent on unconditional cash grants, there will be little available to 
encourage labor market participation and assist the working poor. While 
Alstott characterizes the choice between employment-linked 
redistribution like wage subsidies and the EITC and unconditional cash 
grants as a choice between “work and freedom,” it is equally possible to 
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pose the choice as one between dignity and dependency. Dependency is 
not real freedom, but rather “the liberty of the outcast.”
94 Viewed from 
that perspective, the employment-linked programs do not “lure people 
into the labor market,” as Alstott contends, but are instead programs that 
offer individuals the opportunity to experience a richer and more 
meaningful way of life.  
 
B.II.3 Stakeholder Proposals 
A variation on the cash assistance proposal that avoids the political, 
historical and sociological pitfalls of cash assistance programs is the 
proposal for the state to establish a system of universal stakeholding. 
Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott, in the recent book, THE STAKEHOLDER 
SOCIETY, propose a program which would give every child in America a 
“stake” of $80,000 upon reaching maturity. The stake could be used to 
finance a college or technical education, open a business, buy a home, or 
any other use that the individual chooses. If an individual uses it to 
finance a college education, they would receive it at age eighteen; 
otherwise they would have to wait until they reached age twenty-one. 
The only requirement for obtaining the stake would be the completion of 
high school and U.S. citizenship. Initially the stake would be paid with a 2 
per cent tax on wealth. And those who receive a stake would be required 
to pay it back, with interest in their estate when they die.  Thus while the 
initial federal outlays would be substantial, over time the repayments 
would accumulate in a fund to finance future stakes.
95  
Ackerman and Alstott argue that their stakeholder proposal would give 
young adults significant resources at a time when they most need 
resources to shape their economic prospects. Thus, they claim, it is a 
step toward providing equality of opportunity, comparable to the public 
education system that at one time represented a commitment to 
providing all children with the tools for building their futures. Ackerman 
and Alstott also argue the proposal helps to solidify a meaningful sense of 
citizenship by giving each citizen a concrete stake in his country.  In this 
regard, they compare their proposal to the G.I. Bill that gave citizen-
soldiers funds to start out in life.  
In keeping with the goal of redressing inequality and at the same time 
creating a robust form of citizenship, Ackerman and Alstott also advocate 
that Social Security be transformed into a citizen pension rather than a 
pension linked to employment status. This way, they argue, the issue of 
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old age financial security would express our society’s “commitment to the 
ideal of a dignified old age,” not to a particular role in the labor market.
96  
Ackerman and Alstott claim that their citizenship stakeholder proposal 
would help to equalize opportunity, and would partially overcome those 
aspects of inequality that stem from inter-generational privilege.
97 While 
it would not affect relative incomes in the short run, it is a measure for 
equalizing opportunity over the long run.  
 
B.III  Assessing Non-Employment Linked Proposals for 
Redistribution 
While the foregoing proposals for cash assistance and universal 
stakeholding both involve redistributive measures that do not depend 
upon employment, they differ greatly in their ability to position people in 
the labor market. The cash assistance program is more a safety net than 
a redistributive measure – it would shore up the very bottom of the 
economic ladder without affecting the labor market directly. If the cash 
grant were sufficiently generous, it might make it more difficult for 
employers to obtain low wage labor and thereby indirectly exert an 
upward pressure on wages. However, neither Alstott nor others are 
proposing a cash grant large enough to do that. Thus the cash assistance 
proposals would create an alternative to the labor market rather than 
revise the distributive outcomes generated by the labor market.  
The stakeholder proposal, on the other hand, does more than simply 
provide assistance to the poor. It endows individuals with tools they can 
use to play a meaningful role in society, whether through education, 
training, or entrepreneurial activity. And because the stake is a one-time 
grant to young adults, it does not create long-term disincentives to 
joining the labor force. Rather, it creates opportunities for those who 
otherwise would not have them. It does not discourage labor market 
participation but rather operates as an enabler of more widespread and 
robust labor market participation. The proposal is not directly 
redistributive -- it is available to all young adults, regardless of their 
means -- but because it is financed through a wealth tax, it would be 
redistributive at its funding source. In addition, because the proposed 
benefits are available to all without a means-test, it would encounter less 
political resistence than cash grant programs.  For all these reasons, the 
stakeholder proposal is an approach to long-run inequality that has great 
promise. It addresses the mechanisms by which inequality is 
perpetuated, and thus presents a more fundamental solution to inequality 
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than the proposals considered thus far. 
 
B.IV  Addressing Vulnerability in the Boundaryless 
Workplace 
All of the foregoing proposals have some potential for redressing the 
glaring income inequality that has arisen in the past twenty-five years by 
raising incomes of those at the bottom. Of the proposals discussed, the 
EITC, together with a rise in the minimum wage, seems to offer a 
promising approach to short-term redistribution, and the proposal for 
universal stakeholding, by enabling low wage workers to enhance their 
human capital at an early stage in their work lives, would be 
redistributive over time.  
The proposals considered thus far involve after-the-fact adjustments 
to the operation of the current global labor market and dynamics of the 
digital era firm. None of the proposals will induce firms to generate more 
equalizing compensation practices in their day-to-day operations, none 
will reverse the trend toward more and more winner-take-all markets for 
talent, and none will directly assist workers as they navigate the 
tumultuous new world of work. There are, however, policies available that 
address the problem of inequality by addressing individuals’ vulnerability 
in their role as workers.  
This section will consider some recent U.S. policies that attempt to assist 
in labor market transitions -- worker training allowances, portability of 
benefit plans, publically provided child care.  It will then discuss a 
European proposal that attempts to address the problem of increased 
worker vulnerability directly: the proposal for social drawing rights.  
 
B.IV.1 New Approaches to Economic Transitions 
a. Training 
A number of policies have been discussed and/or attempted in recent 
years that would help ease transitions necessitated by the boundaryless 
workplace. These include requirements for benefit portability, worker 
retraining accounts, and expanded federal funding for child care. In 1998, 
Congress enacted the Workforce Investment Act
98 (WIA), as a 
complement the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996 that ushered in welfare reform. The WIA 
provides federal funds for states to establish “career centers” that are to 
be one-stop delivery systems for the unemployed and job seekers. These 
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One-Stop career centers administer unemployment insurance but they 
also do a lot more. They provide a  clearing house for job placement 
services, offer job training information, provide computer training and run 
workshops on resume writing, and offer free faxing and Internet access.  
They also provide information on labor market trends, the availability of 
training providers, and evaluations of local training options. According to 
Linda Angello, New York State's Labor Commissioner. "We've been 
working hard to change our image from the unemployment people to the 
employment office. There's been a change in philosophy and a change in 
the way we do business."
99  
Under the Act, localities are required to establish a Workforce 
Investment Board comrpised of local employers to match the One-Stop 
career services to the local job market. WIA also provides funds for 
Individual Training Accounts (ITAs) for workers who require job 
training.
100 Training can include occupational skills training, one-the-job 
training, cooperative education, private sector training, skilll upgrading 
and retraining, entrepreneurial training, job readiness training, and adult 
education and literacy activities.
101  
At present, most cities are in the process of establishing One-Stop 
centers. New York City opened a One-Stop center in Queens a year ago, 
and plans five more in the next two years. Los Angeles has opened 18 
centers, Chicago has 17, and San Fransisco has only three. In Austin, 
Texas, three One-Stop centers and four satellite offices have been 
established. These centers have utterly transformed the old employment 
offices, which used to be primarily surveillance mechanisms to ensure 
that recipients were able, available and actively searching for work, more 
like a parole office than a place to get assistance. The new centers offer 
job search facilities and counseling that are not only attuned to the local 
labor market, but also to the local populations. Large city centers are 
offering service in many languages to deal with their diverse populations. 
Their services are designed to provide assistance in finding employment 
at all levels, including offering workshops on self-employment. One 
worker, a former CNN employee laid off last May, said of her experience 
with the Queens One-Stop,, “My experience was remarkable. I was very 
impressed. They treated us like professionals rather than problems.”
102  
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One commentator has criticized the program for its over-reliance on 
the principle of consumer choice.
103  Under the statute, individuals are 
given vouchers to pay for training on the theory that it will help create a 
market based system for training services. Nan Ellis is critical of the use 
of vouchers for job training on the grounds that job-seekers too often 
cannot make informed choices about either their labor market prospects 
or about the quality of the training options available to them.
104 Instead, 
she suggests that there be additional mechanisms to ensure that the 
centers provide job-seekers with reliable information about the training 
opportunities, in readable and comprehensible form, together with critical 
evaluations of each one, and that job counselors be trained to help job-
seekers select appropriate training options.  
While the WIA is quite new, and One-Stop centers are just being 
established in most locations, it is a program that could help workers 
weather career transitions. If the One-Stop centers do ensure informed 
and reasoned choice amongst job-seekers, they have the potential to be 
effective mechanisms for dealing with the vicissitudes of the boundaryless 
labor market. If they were funded at a level that enabled them to offer 
significant and on-going training programs for all that wanted them, and 
if they included local unions and community groups on their Workforce 
Investment Boards, they would begin to resemble the Worker Retraining 
and Upskilling Centers advocated in Chapter 10, above. 
 
b. Child Care 
In addition to the WIA, there have been some expanded support for child 
care as part of the work-to-welfare programs established under the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act. A 1996 enactment 
established the Child Care Development Block Grant, to consolidate four 
federal programs that made funds available for child care for AFDC 
recipients moving into the workforce and for certain other low-income 
working families. The new program gives block grants to the states to 
establish and design their own child care programs. The program is 
poorly funded – about $3 billion – but the law permits states to use some 
of their TANF funds for child care as well.
105 
These programs do not go nearly far enough. Lack of affordable quality 
child care is a major impediment to full labor force participation for 
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women. The new welfare philosophy that mandates workforce 
participation cannot succeed without providing the necessary 
infrastructure of child care. Adequate child care is necessary for women 
throughout the income distribution, but especially for those at the 
bottom. When women are forced to miss work to stay home with a sick 
child, or leave work early to attend doctor’s appointments, and when 
women are forced to fill gaps for school holidays and snow days, they are 
penalized in the labor market.  The new workplace requires flexibility on 
the part of employees but it does not promise them flexibility in return. 
Without reliable child care, women are not only penalized in the old-
fashioned days for missing days or coming in late, they experience new 
types of penalties as well. Women with children are often unable to take 
advantage of after-hours training opportunities, unable to engage in 
informal networking in bars and cafes after work, and are less available 
for travel. Even though some enlightened employers are willing to give 
employees flex-time or make other accommodations, without funded and 
reliable child care, women workers will always be living on the edge and 
sometimes falling off.  
Child care needs to be understand as part of the social infrastructure 
required for our economic system to operate. One we abandoned a cash 
grant approach to welfare and chose instead to encourage work, then we 
became obligated to ensure that the preconditions for women’s 
participation in the workforce are in place. We finance a public education 
system in order, in part at least, to enable individuals to be productive 
members of society, and we provide a system of junior colleges and adult 
education programs to provide lifetime learning possibilities. For the 
same reasons, we need to finance adequate child care.  
  
c. Benefit Portability 
The boundaryless workplace is not a frictionless one. When workers 
cross boundaries between firms, they often pay a cost in terms of 
insurance protection. In the United States, most forms of social insurance 
are employer-centered. The federal government mandates old age 
assistance and provides some insurance against disability and accidental 
death through through the social security program. In addition, states 
provide insurance against workplace injury in the workers compensation 
systems and insurance against unemployment through their 
unemployment insurance programs. However, these programs provide 
bare bones programs at best. Thus since the mid- twentieth century, 
most American workers looked to their employer for medical insurance, 
long-term disability insurance and meaningful pension coverage. For a                                              KATHERINE V.W. STONE 
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complex set of reasons that included good actuarial practices, avoidance 
of adverse selection, and the desire to encourage worker loyalty and 
attachment, most employer-sponsored benefit plans have been 
structured to bind the worker to the firm. Thus, for example, until 1980s, 
most pension plans were defined benefit plans, with long vesting periods 
and back-loaded benefit formulae. These plans encouraged long-term 
service and penalized workers who were mobile. Similarly, most health 
insurance plans had waiting periods and exclusions for pre-existing 
conditions, features that made it risky for a worker to change jobs. In the 
boundaryless workplace, in which workers change jobs frequently, benefit 
portability has become an urgent problem. 
There have been modifications to the laws and practices governing 
pensions and health insurance in the past two decades that address the 
issue of portability. First, in the area of pensions, there has been a 
general shift to from defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans. 
The latter are inherently more portable because the benefits continue to 
accumulate in the employees account until she reaches retirement, no 
matter where she works. Sums accrued in defined benefit plans, on the 
other hand, are forfeited if an employee leaves before her benefits vest, 
and are frozen in amount if she leaves after they have vested.  
Second, in the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) 
Congress set a maximum vesting period of ten years and, in 1986, 
lowered the maximum  for defined contribution plans to five. Prior to 
1974, most plans had no vesting period, so all benefits were forfeited if 
an employee left the employer.  
Third, in 1992, Congress expanded the situations in which employees 
who changes jobs could “rollover” assets accumulated in their accounts to 
a new plan without incurring taxes or penalty liability. This change was 
applicable to defined contribution plans, enhancing their portability.  
Fourth, since the late 1970s, Congress has expanded the possibilities 
for individuals to engage in individual tax-preferred retirement savings, 
through expanding the use of IRAs, providing for 401(k) plans, providing 
for medical and Roth IRAs (for educational savings), and establishing 
other such mechanisms. And finally, the recent move to cash balance 
plans and other hybrid plans is a move that increases portability for 
younger and mobile workers, although the process of conversion can 
have catastrophic effects on older, long-term workers.
106  
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In addition, in the health insurance area there has also been some 
movement toward greater portability. In 1985, Congress enacted the 
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) that requires 
employers who have health insurance plans to offer departing 
beneficiaries the opportunity to continue their coverage for 18 months. 
While employees are generally required to pay for their COBRA coverage 
themselves, it nonetheless means that they do not lose their health 
insurance when they terminate employment. In 1996, Congress further 
expanded portability with enacting the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA). HIPAA requires group plans to reduce waiting 
periods for pre-existing conditions when employees move from one 
health plan to another. It also raised the tax deductability of health 
insurance premiums for individuals who were self-employed. These 
provisions make it easier for an individual to retain health coverage as 
they move between workplaces.  
Despite these recent changes, benefits are not yet fully portable, and 
thus remain an impediment to individuals who have peripatetic work 
lives.  Some proposals to further increase pension portability include the 
total elimination of vesting requirements, requiring service credit transfer 
when a participant moves between employers, and expanding the ability 
of employees to use IRAs. Another approach is to encourage the 
formation of multi-employer pension plans that operate on a regional 
basis in which all employees in a locality can participate. This kind of 
community-based pension plan could be sponsored by a geographically-
based citizen union, of the type discussed in Chapter 10. Alternatively, 
converting social security into a citizen’s pension and increasing its 
amount, as Ackerman and Alstott propose, would provide near-perfect 
pension portability.  
In the area of health insurance, portability could be increased by 
national health insurance, but that option seems beyond political reach. 
Another measure that would to enhance portability would be an 
amendment to the Internal Revenue Code to permit full deductions for 
individuals for the cost of health insurance premiums. This change would 
permit individuals to select their own health insurance plan and thus side-
step the employer-sponsored plan altogether.
107  
The programs described above for job training, child care, and benefit 
portability together have the potential of helping enable individuals to 
participate in the new labor market in a meaningful way. They work in 
conjunction with programs like the EITC and the minimum wage to 
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alleviate some of the problems that stand in the way of success in the 
boundaryless workplace. But like the EITC and the minimum wage, they 
need to be expanded in scope and funding in order to realize their full 
potential. Even then, however, they cannot ensure success for everyone 
– the new workplace presents new challenges and will generate a new 
mix of winners and losers. Those who are not flexible, who have personal 
situations or personality traits that lead them to require stability, 
certainty, and routine, will not fare well. The proposal for universal 
stakeholding would provide some measure of assistance to permit 
individuals, at a crucial time in their life-cycle, to start with a solid 
foundation. All these measures are a far cry from the old safety net of 
AFDC and general relief. Yet they have the potential for providing a new 
kind of safety net – a safety net of empowerment and opportunity for 
change, rather than a safety net of minimal subsistence and stasis.  
 
B.IV.2 The European Proposal for Special Drawing Rights 
A very different approach to the problems of inequality and vulnerability 
flexibility has emerged in Europe. In 1996, the European Commission 
convened a group of labor relations experts to consider the impact of 
changes in the workplace on labor regulation in Europe. The group, of 
which Alain Supiot was the chair, studied the changing industrial relations 
practices in Europe and in 2000 issued its report, known as the Supiot 
Report. The Report describes a changing employment landscape in 
Europe that mirrors changes I have described in the United States -- a 
movement away from industrial era job structures toward more flexible 
industrial relations practices. It finds that the new work practices have 
entailed a loss of job and income security for European workers. The 
Report calls for new mechanisms to provide workers with “active 
security” by which they mean mechanism that equip individuals to move 
from one job to another. They contrast this need for active security from 
the welfare type of security of the past: 
 
Rather than making welfare a type of compensation made available 
after supposedly unavoidable economic damage has been done, it 
should be turned into something which gives individuals and 
intermediary groups their own resources, which, in turn, will enable 
them to equip themselves with active security to cope with risks. . .  
It therefore follows that security in the form of guarantees of a 
minimum standard of life, as traditionally provided by social security 
systems, has to be supplemented, because of the need for economic 
flexibility, by the objective of shaping, maintaining, and developing INCOME INEQUALITY IN THE DIGITAL ERA 
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people’s competencies during their lifetimes.
108 
 
The Supiot Report contains a number of suggestions for changes in the 
institutions regulating work to provide active security. Their most 
visionary, and most controversial, proposal is for the a creation of “social 
drawing rights” to facilitate worker mobility and to enable workers to 
weather transitions. The concept of social drawing rights is derived from 
existing arrangements in which workers have rights to time off from work 
for specified purposes such as union representation, maternity leave, and 
so forth. The report makes an analogy to sabbatical leaves, maternity 
leaves, time off for union representatives and training vouchers to 
observe that “we are surely witnessing here the emergence of a new type 
of social right, related to work in general.”
109 
Under the proposal, an individual would accumulate social drawing 
rights on the basis of time spent at work. The drawing rights could be 
used for paid leave for purposes of obtaining training, working in the 
family sphere, or performing charitable or public service work. It would 
be a right that the individual could invoke on an optional basis to 
navigate career transitions, thereby giving flexibility and security in an 
era of uncertainty. As Supiot writes, “They are drawing rights as they can 
be brought into effect on two conditions: establishment of sufficient 
reserve and the decision of the holder to make use of that reserve. They 
are  social  drawing rights as they are social both in the way they are 
established . .. . and in their aims (social usefulness).
110 
The purpose of the social drawing rights is to enable all individuals the 
flexibility to take time away from the workplace in order to manage 
transitions and build human capital. This approach responds to the new 
conditions of work lives, in which careers unfold in unpatterned ways and 
require an individual to operate both inside and outside the formal labor 
market at different and unpredictable times. Social drawing rights would 
smooth these transitions and give individuals the resources to retool and 
to weather the unpredictable cycles of today’s workplace. Like the 
Ackerman-Alstott proposal for stakeholder grants, it would be an 
equalizing measure not because it is overtly redistributive but because it 
would help to equalize opportunity. Like the Ackerman-Alstott proposal 
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for stakeholder grants, the proposal for social drawing rights would be a 
social investment in the ability of all to participate as equals in the 
emerging economic order.  
The Supiot Report does not specify in detail how the social drawing 
rights would be funded, other than to suggest that they be funded by a 
combination of contributions from the enterprise, the state, social 
insurance funds, and perhaps individual savings. The question of funding 
may not be a major concern in Europe because most European countries 
already make substantial expenditures on social welfare that could, at 
least theoretically, be redeployed in this fashion. But to transpose the 
idea of social drawing rights to the United States would require a major 
reorientation in our social policy.  
In the United States, we have precedents for the concept of paid time 
off with reemployment rights to facilitate career transitions or life 
emergencies. There are well established precedents for paid leaves for 
military service, jury duty, union business, and other socially valuable 
activities. Some occupations also offer periodic sabbatical leaves. The 
concept is also built into the idea of temporary disability in state workers 
compensation and other insurance programs, which provide 
compensation and guarantee reemployment rights for temporary 
absences. The recent Parental Leave Act extends the concept of leave 
time to parenting obligations, although it does not mandate that such 
leave time be compensated. These programs all reflect and acknowledge 
the importance of subsidized time away from the workplace to facilitate a 
greater contribution to the workplace. They could serve as the basis for 
developing a more generalized concept of career transition leave.  
Like the stakeholder proposal, the proposal for social drawing rights an 
innovative policy proposal to date that is directly responsive to the needs 
of individuals in the face of the changing workplace.  It has the potential 
to realize the ideal of freedom while at the same time equalizing 
opportunity, creating conditions of success, and reinforcing the central 
role of work in our lives. For these r e a s o n s ,  i t  d e s e r v e s  t o  b e  t a k e n  
seriously on both sides of the Atlantic.  
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